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Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program— Its DNA Markers
• Agenda
 Overview of Organizational Culture and Change
 Shuttle Heritage—DNA Markers From Apollo
 Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
• RTF Technical Changes
• Impacts on Culture from Organizational changes
 Columbia and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
• RTF Technical Changes
• Impacts on Culture from Organizational Changes
 Conclusions—Evidence of Change
• Post STS107 continuous improvement
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Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program—Its DNA Markers
• What is The Culture of an Organization
• Organizational culture is the common set of beliefs, values, and norms, together 
with symbols like dramatized events and personalities that represents the unique 
character of an organization. 
• Culture provides the framework and context for behavior within and by it.
• It is not defined by the actions of a few, though their visibility may be high
• Culture guides the way individuals and groups in an organization interact with 
one another and with elements outside it.
• Need for a Cultural Change is most often recognized or considered after a 
significant event such as an accident
• Key to any change like this is for the individuals within the organization to decide 
to change their behavior
 First , understand what the current behaviors are that lead to the undesirable event
 Second, decide which of those behaviors need to be changed for success and
 Third, implement activities/ structure that modifies those behaviors
• Presentation will examine some of those behaviors and let you be the judge of 
whether the cultural changes have occurred
Overview of Organizational Culture
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Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program—Its DNA Markers
• Shuttle Heritage began as early as 1967 with Apollo
• Apollo Technical Model for Spacecraft Development focused on four 
critical aspects 
1. Design
2. Test
3. Control of changes
4. Interpretation of discrepancies
• Design principles 
 Build it simple then double up on redundant  components or systems-- Make it 
fail safe
• Use established technology for improved reliability
• Examples:  Hypergolic propellants, 3 fuel cells, series/parallel redundancy in valves, 
regulators, diodes and capacitors were no single failure would be catastrophic
• Minimize functional interfaces between complex pieces of hardware—simple interfaces 
leads to individual contractor work packages without encumbering  complex 
integration DDT&E 
– Wiring between Apollo spacecraft and Saturn V launch vehicle limited to 100 wires and 
between lunar and command and service module limited to 36 wires, mostly for 
redundancy needs
• Closed loop accountability of change impacts
Shuttle Heritage-- Its DNA Markers
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Program—Its DNA Markers
• Apollo Testing Philosophy
 Flight “Qualify” Launch Vehicle, Spacecraft, and integrated  
Support System before “manned flight”
• Example:  Little Joe II vehicles (5 flights) used to qualify the Launch 
Abort System in cases from on pad to  high “Q” to upper stage separation 
 Building Block Approach for each mission as well as each phase of 
the mission
 Engineering Judgment was driving principle in testing, funding not 
available for Statistically significant reliability testing
• Component testing emphasized rather than rely only on final system 
level
• ATP testing was critical component of demonstrating reliability and 
screening all flight units for workmanship defects
• Thermal cycling included on all ATP acceptances to screen marginal 
fabrication processes
• Every Saturn V Booster was “full mission duration” hot fired at 
Mississippi Test Facility and retested at MAF before delivery to KSC
Shuttle Heritage-- Its DNA Markers
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Program
• Testing has been considered the most important factor leading to the 
high degree of reliability of Apollo—Funding readily available 
 Single Prototype—Qualification level testing to demonstrate performance
 Acceptance Testing—to assure no workmanship defects
 Orbiter continued to use the same workmanship screening levels 
• Flight History shows we have failures well before expected—failure 
modes not seen in qualification program
 Frequently the cause is qualification testing  not performed to combined flight 
environments
 Qualification unit  configuration different from flight hardware configuration
 Unintentional Process changes evolved in the manufacturing process
 Life used up on ground processing  and not accounted for in operating life
 Incremental life assessments  not performed to verify performance—no real 
hardware tear down and analyses
 Lack of trending data, missing subtle indicators or just not listening to the 
hardware
 Normalization of deviances—seen so many times becomes fair wear and tear 
versus failure to be corrected before next flight
Shuttle Heritage--Its DNA Markers
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Program
• Apollo heritage hardware selected for Shuttle included
• IBM Computers—AP 101’s a derivative of the Apollo computer used in 
Skylab
 AP-101’s used in first Fly By Wire  aircraft at Dryden—F-8 Crusader
 First flight on 27 August 1976.
 Used on the Corsair to validate the Shuttle flight control system before first 
atmospheric flight
• Fuel Cell Power plant
 Additional sub-stack added (32 cells to power section) for additional capability to 
allow return on 1 FCP
 Cryogenic tanks same as Apollo
• On-Orbit Digital Auto Pilot and Orbital Rendezvous guidance and 
navigation were adapted from Apollo
• Autonomous onboard navigation used Kalman Filtering developed for 
Apollo by MIT/Draper Labs  used in Shuttle onboard navigation
• Descent Guidance and Mission Planning for Shuttle was expansion of the 
Gemini and Apollo systems
• ET Vent and Relief valves were from Saturn V hardware configuration 
Shuttle Heritage-- Its DNA Markers
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• Apollo 1 Fire
• A spark caused by an electrical short in a 100% oxygen atmosphere set 
fire to an abundance of flammable material
• •  Vulnerable design and material choices for wiring, atmosphere, cabin 
materials, and hatch door.
• Root Causes/Underlying Issues
 Combustible Material in Crew Module.
 Teflon-coated wiring susceptible to wear and collateral damage
 Single gas (100% Oxygen) vs. two gas (Nitrogen and Oxygen)
 Inward opening hatch door—Modified just prior to test from External opening door
• • Poor quality control and workmanship.
 KSC Quality Inspector cited multiple deficiencies concerning equipment, parts, 
procedures, workmanship and contamination.
• •  Inadequate provision for emergency response, rescue and medical 
assistance.
• •   Budget and schedule pressures resulted in the over-prioritization of 
speed to completion.
• Cost overruns and schedule delays were acknowledged as contributing 
factors to the design, manufacturing, and quality control process issues.
Shuttle Heritage--Its DNA Markers
Page 8
Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program
• Apollo Lesson to Learn
• Past successes do not obviate the need to continually reassess the 
rationale for accepted risks.
 NASA had “successfully” logged over 1000 hours of flight time under the same 
conditions before the Apollo 1 fire.
• Expertise in materials properties throughout a defined and 
understood range of operating conditions in crucial.
 Teflon may have been the correct choice for insulation and fire resistance, but it 
was the wrong choice for resistance to deformation and damage, leading to a 
string of cascading failure modes and effects. 
• Every redesign or modification has unintended consequences
 Modification of the Apollo Crew Hatch Latch was made prior to the fire in 
response to a previous failure when it failed to remain closed
 We are never as smart as we think we are
• Lessons Learned captured in set of design standards for manned 
spacecraft design, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC 08080, later 
captured as Shuttle Standards, NSTS-08080)
• Test philosophy fully vetted in SSME element and its  test program at 
SSC
Shuttle Heritage-- Its DNA Markers
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• Redesign SRM Joints and sealing system, with procedures for 
assembly and inspection prior to next flight
• Consolidate decision making and review processes into Space Shuttle 
Program Organization instead of as individual Center efforts
• Complete review of Safety critical items and tighten procedures for 
granting waivers
• Establish an SR&QA Office reporting directly to NASA Administrator
• Improve Communications between Centers and make Crew 
Commander part of Flight Review Process
• Improve Landing safety, especially in Orbiter brakes and nose wheel 
steering
• Make effort to provide Crew Escape System for use during controlled, 
gliding flight
• Establish a flight rate consistent with resources 
• Increase rigor in critical item installation, test, and maintenance 
procedures
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture:  Rogers Commission 
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• Program Level changes to CIL and Hazard documentation 
updated to provide more focus on risks and their controls, 
shortcomings in eliminating the risk, and methodology for 
approving residual risks in non-redundant, critical hardware
• Boiler room discussions provided forum for healthy debate on 
validity of assumptions of “credibility”, completeness of 
testing, and applicability of any optional workarounds 
available to mitigate consequences  of failures, should they 
occur.
• Independent Contractor design assessments were performed to 
identify CIL criticality of each component
• Differences were resolved as part of Program Re-baselining
Effort across all Elements
• Orbiter implemented 76 major redesigns, including robust 
improvements in Landing Gear Braking system, Drag Chute, 
Crew Escape Pole, and 17 Inch Disconnect Latch mod.
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
RTF—Post Challenger Program Recovery Actions--Technical changes
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• RTF—Post Challenger Program Recovery Actions--Technical changes
• Performed in-depth review and re-baselining of all Program 
Requirements 
• For Orbiter and GFE, Two major milestones set up to define, assess 
and track this body of work were Design Requirements Review 
(DRR) and the Design Certification Review (DCR)
• A complete review of all the verification and validation 
documentation was performed, with representatives from astronaut, 
SR&QA, Mission Operations and KSC Shuttle Processing 
representatives participating
 Focus was on the completeness of the testing and verification of all the 
hardware and software 
 Deficiencies in designs were identified, categorized for corrective action, 
• Redesign mandatory, constraints to first flight, or acceptable to fly until Fix can be 
implemented
• Desirable,  but not required for first flight—rationale included work around or 
alternative (scrub, etc) available
• Desirable,  but not sufficient value added—risk acceptable, can not be eliminated
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
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Post STS-51L RSRM / Return to 
Flight Configuration
• The key changes for RSRM include: 
 Improved case field joint with a capture feature and third 
O-ring
 Improved field joint thermal protection with a rubber J-leg 
replacing putty
 Added field joint heaters to ensure O-rings can track 
dynamic motions even under cold ambient conditions
 Improved ply angles in nozzle phenolic rings to preclude 
anomalous pocketing erosion
 More robust metal housings in the nozzle to increase 
structural margins and accommodate dual and redundant 
O-ring seals
 An improved nozzle/case joint with 100 radial bolts to 
reduce the dynamic joint motion plus addition of a bonded 
insulation flap with a wiper O-ring in place of the putty 
thermal barrier
• Shortly after return to flight, an insulation J-leg 
thermal barrier was developed for the igniter inner 
and outer joints 
• Subscale testing included a transient pressure test 
article and an nozzle joint environmental simulator
• Six static tests were conducted, including tests at hot 
and cold specification bounds with side loads applied 
to simulate those induced by the external tank 
attachments.
• The final static test Production Verification Motor No. 
1 (PVM-1) prior to return to flight was a full-scale flaw 
test motor to verify the redundant features of critical 
seals
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Post STS-51L SSME Phase II / Return 
to Flight Configuration
• SSME FMEA/CIL  rewritten
 New FMEA/CIL drove 18 mandatory changes to SSME before next flight
• Established an SSME Margin Improvement Board 
 Identified an additional 50 items as mandatory changes
• Additional 90,000 seconds of hot fire time accrued during RTF period, including full 
recertification to 104% RPL
 Engine 2105 FCE (Flight Certification Extension)
• Completed two successful Phase II FPL certification cycles 
• 23 test and 11,304 seconds was demonstrated for the FCE first segment
• 64 tests and 30,799 seconds were completed with no engine malfunctions for the FCE
• Engine modifications required by the next flight by the post Challenger review actions were added to 2105 for 
concurrent development and certification testing
Block II 
Controller
Nozzle 
insulation 
Powerhead
Improvements
LPOTP thrust bearing 
improvements 
SSME Phase II Page 14
Post STS-51L External Tank / Return 
to Flight Configuration
 No Major Design Changes (Light 
Weight Tank Configuration) 
following STS-51L
 External Tank  FMEA/CIL  and 
Hazards Assessments were 
rewritten
 Review of fracture control and 
NDE practices
• Added post proof x-ray of all weld 
repairs
• All indications go through MRB
 Changes added later include:
• LO2 Pressurization System – fixed 
orifice flow control valve
• Deletion of the External Tank Range 
Safety System
• Development of load indicators to 
support DOLILU
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Post STS-51L Solid Rocket Booster / 
Return to Flight Configuration
• SRB hardware changes for return to flight
 ET attach ring design changed from 270° to 360 °
 T-O umbilical added to aft skirt
 Aft skirt GN2 purge redesigned to redirect warm GN2 toward 
SRM aft bulkhead
 SRB blast container on HDP was redesigned
 Development flight instrumentation added
• Nose assembly was redesigned for DFI
• Added DFI to forward skirt
– Added brackets for equipment mounting panels, connector plates, 
and approx 100 holes for misc. Brackets, clips, etc.
• Systems tunnel redesigned to accommodate DFI
and the SRM joint redesign
• DFI added to aft skirt
ET Attach Ring T-0 Umbilical
SRB Blast Container
On Hold Down Post
Development Flight 
Instrumentation
GN2 Purge
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• Redesigns were implemented where Mandatory Corrective Actions were 
identified—Example below
• MPS Modifications shown below
 LH2/LO2 ET/Orbiter 17-Inch Disconnect : Addition of Latch Mechanism to valve visor to 
prevent flow forces from oscilating visor 
 LO2 Pre-valve:  Filters added to Pneumatic actuator 
 LH2/LO2 Fill and Drain Valve:  position indicator ,Fabrication upgrades
 LH2/LO2 T-O Umbilical:  Modified support plate to accommodate Debris plate. 
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
RTF—Post Challenger Program Recovery Actions--Technical changes
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 New Critical 1 and 1R CIL’s:  44 and 27, 
respectively
 Total Waivers , all CIL’s went from 46 to 270
• Ground rules changes in CIL classification 
caused most of the upgrades
 Any Leakages of H2/O2 classified as Critical 1—
considered as a hazard, but not automatically a 
CIL
 Failure Modes considered credible without 
regard for likelihood.
 Highlighted fact that “not all CIL’s are of equal 
risk” but book kept as if they were
• Impacts flowed down to OMRS New 
Requirements added as a result of CIL 
upgrades—85
• Revised  to include new criteria—192
• New LCC’s- 28, Revised 15
Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program
• RTF—Post Challenger—Technical changes
 Program Recovery Actions (cont’d) 
 Flight Operations approach similarly focused on adequacy of the Flight Rules and 
Crew Procedures 
• Participation in CIL and Hazard Boileroom reviews enabled flow-down of impacts 
into flight operations documentation
• Format was upgraded for Flight Rules to capture Rationale for these rules, criteria 
for classifying a component failed, and options for flight workarounds where 
available
• This structuring of documentation assured information would not be lost over 
time as workforce turnover occurs   
 Return to Flight required 974 days, with Discovery launching on 29 September 1988
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
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Program
• RTF—Post Challenger Program Recovery Actions--Cultural changes
 Program Approach to Recommendation to change Management Structure and 
eliminate tendency for management isolation included
• Director of NSTS filled with former shuttle Commander, reporting directly to Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight 
• Two Deputies to NSTS Director established at KSC and JSC responsible for operational 
aspects and day-to-day management, respectively
• Director , Shuttle Projects Office at MSFC designated as NASA Headquarters position 
responsible for management and coordination of MSFC projects  and reporting to 
NSTS Deputy Director 
• At KSC, Shuttle Operations and Engineering rolled up under Director of STS 
Management and Operations, reporting to KSC Center Director
• Robust Flight Readiness Review and MMT processes included adding Director of Flight 
Crew Office and flight crew commander, along with formal records published of 
meetings
• Space Flight Safety Panel set up to report directly to Associate Administrator for 
SR&QA
• Office of SR&QA established at NASA Headquarters to report directly to NASA 
Administrator—provides dual path for elevating serious issues  
• Established NSRS Hotline for Anomalous reporting of issues to NASA HQ
• Placement of Astronauts throughout management positions
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
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Program
• RTF—Post Challenger
 Lessons to Learn
 Qualification Program needs to demonstrate performance under 
realistic flight conditions and environments
• “Test what you fly, fly what you test”
• Analysis tools must be test anchored—used to augment testing, not in lieu of 
testing
 Investigate and understand the physics of each failure, the risks should 
it occur in flight, and corrective action needed to fix the cause before 
flight if risk is unacceptable
• Do not let repeated non-conformances become acceptable as “normal 
performance” 
• Test when you do not have the knowledge of the physics
• Believe the hardware, it does not know how to provide wrong data
 Reusable Solid Rocket Motor management culture change was 
dramatic
• Reliability via Process Control
• Human Rating 
 Did our Decision Making behavior Change?
Challenger and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
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Program Improvements during Post 
STS-107 Return to Flight
• Improvements In Tech Excellence, 
Communications & Decision-making
 Space Shuttle Program Mission 
Management Team
 NASA Engineering And Safety Center
• Space Shuttle Improvements
 Reinforced Carbon-carbon Wing Panels 
And Nose Cap
 Wing Leading Edge Structural Subsystem
 Rudder Speed Brake
 Foreign Object Debris
 Closeout Photography Process
 Launch Pad Ground Support Equipment
 Fixed And Rotating Service Structures
 In-flight inspection and repair
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• Program Recovery Actions
• Improvements in MMT “decision making” skills 
 Outside Consultants contracted to provide operational and decision 
making training for Management Team, including mid and senior level 
managers
 Independent consultants provided cultural and communications skills 
training with feedback recommendations from observations during 
meetings, boards and working groups
 MMT membership now a Program certified position—minimum 
Training includes
• MMT Simulation training 
• Review of LCC, OMRS, and Flight Rules and Tools to support launch 
decisions
• Decision making and risk management, including studies of Challenger, 
Redundancy and Reliability
 Increase focus on “Safety First,” elevating risks to  Directorate, Project 
and Program level when required  as integral part of Risk Management  
 Seek, Recognize, and deal with all dissenting or alternate views at all 
levels of program and project reviews
RTF—Post Columbia—Cultural changes
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• Program Recovery Actions (cont’d)
• Increased robustness to processes for Project, Program and Agency FRR—increased level 
of detail for special topics and issues
• Strengthen Engineering and Safety
 Established Independent Technical Authority (ITA) within Engineering and 
S&MA disciplines
 Increased NASA  system  engineers oversight  into  contractor tasks
 Established NESC for augmentation of independent technical  expertise into 
special problems
 Emphasized Resolving problems rather than resolve schedule impacts
 Benchmarked and migrated best practices into NASA Safety Culture
RTF—Post Columbia—Cultural changes
 Improved Risk Assessment tools
• Debris  liberation models based on additional NDE and 
imagery to better characterize physics of losses
• Transport models
• Impact prediction and capability models based on test
• Rigorous ET Post flight  review and assessments
• Continuous Improvement, Modifications and Inline 
 Implemented broader use of Probability Risk 
Assessment Tools
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• RTF—Post Columbia—Technical changes
 Orbiter Changes, Major Examples
 Eight Significant RTF Modifications, 36 additional Modifications to improve 
systems Reliabilities
• OBSS with its 2 Sensor packages  
• Wing Leading Edge Instrumentation
• EVA Digital Camera
• New ET Umbilical Camera
• New Digital Crew Handheld Cameras with downlink for Orbiter post separation viewing of 
tank  and for Viewing from ISS during RPM 
• WLE Spar Sneak Flow Protection
• WLE Carrier Panel Horse Collar Gap Filler Redesign
• SSOR and WVS Antenna Relocation to improve EVA Coverage
 Robust suite of Decision Making Tools
• RCC Damage Limit Analyses, high Velocity Impact Testing and Arc Jet Testing
• Tile Impact testing and damage capability models, 
• Repair tools and materials tested for Tile and RCC with Man-in-the-loop procedures and 
entry conditions to characterize performance with limitations
 Technical Issues Resolved based on previous anomalies, inspections during 
downtime and reassessments of life limits
• Flex hoses inspected and replacements driven by damages detected
• Point Sensor Box investigations based on STS-114 Tanking anomalies
• COPV Life Limit methodology limitations and tiger team formed to resolve
Columbia and Its Impacts on Shuttle Culture
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STS-114
External Tank – 121
RTF Modifications
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STS-114
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor– RSRM-92
Propellant Horizontal Storage
Structural Safety Factor
Inactive Stiffener Stub TPS 
Redesign Due to Corrosion
New Stellar Technologies, Inc. 
(STI) Operational Pressure 
Transducer (OPT) 
RTF Modifications
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STS-114
Solid Rocket Booster– BI125
• Separation/Deceleration
 BSMs – Igniter, Aeroheat Shield,
 Plume, FOD, and Throat
 Bolt Catcher/NSI PC
 Forward/Aft Separation Bolts
 Thruster Pressure Cartridge
 Forward Skirt Aft Clevis
 Ring/Lower Bay
• ET/SRB Attach
 ET Attach Rings and Aft Struts
 Diagonal Strut Restraint Cable
 EPDM Covers
• Aft Assembly
 FIV Connector and Backshell
 Aft Skirt GN2 Purge (Prelaunch)
 Blast Container
ET
SRB
ET
SRB
Separation 
Plane
RTF Modifications
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STS-114
Space Shuttle Main Engine -
1 - 2057
2 - 2054
3 - 2056
RTF Modifications
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STS-114
Mission - Integration
Imagery Improvements
WB-57 High Altitude Research Program
RTF Modifications
Flowliner Placard
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Space Shuttle Debris 
Assessment History
Reynaldo J. Gómez III
Mail Code EG3
NASA Johnson Space Center
reynaldo.j.gomez@nasa.gov
July 2010
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Program
No analysis capabilities.
Design changes included:
• Removed ET lightning 
bands
• Removed ET anti geyser 
line
• Modified hold down post 
ablator and RTV minimized
• Modified beanie cap to 
reduce ice formation
• Foamed over multiple areas 
with thermal shorts.
Liftoff and ascent debris has been a problem since STS-1. Several vehicle 
modifications were made to the tank and pad during the Operational Flight 
Tests to reduce this threat.
Craig, Mark K, “Shuttle Launch Debris - Sources, Consequences, Solutions,” Space Shuttle Performance 
Lessons Learned Conference Report, NASA CP-2283, 1983, p. 159-185.
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Liftoff and ascent debris has been a problem since STS-1. Several vehicle 
modifications were made to the tank and pad during the Operational Flight Tests to 
reduce this threat.
Early debris transport
• No formal configuration control
• No debris release models
• Very limited transport & capability 
models. Foam and ice only.
STS-27R
• 644 total hits, 244 > 1 inch
• Cause traced to SRB nosecone 
ablator
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Post STS-107 an extensive amount of development and testing was 
performed to improve debris models.
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STS-27R simplified geometry 
& trajectory calculation
STS-126 refined geometry & 
acreage impact predictions
2010 Aerospace Corporation 
probabilistic impact results
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Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
Two Decision Histories and the Normalization of Deviance
STS 51-L – O-ring Erosion STS 107 – Foam Debris
Wake up call 
• STS-51C, January 1985, cool weather launch
• Primary o-ring erosion
• Gas to secondary o-ring
Wake up call 
• STS-112
• Bipod ramp foam loss at 31 sec.
• Impacted SRB aft ET attach ring
Insufficient data
• O-ring resilience at cold temperature
• Poor trending of data
• Engineers could not prove that cold 
temperatures were unsafe 
Insufficient data
• Affects of large foam debris impacts and RCC damage 
tolerance modeling
• Imagery data not obtained
• Engineers could not prove that foam strikes were unsafe 
Pre-flight assessment 
• Acceptable risk – sealing system redundant
FRR assessment 
• Acceptable risk – in family
Workforce fatigue and schedule pressure
• High flight rate – goal of 15/year in 1986, and 
24/year by 1990
• 4 scrubs for 61C (1/12/86) and 1 for 51L
(1/28/86)
Workforce reductions and schedule pressure
• Multiple (40%) reductions during 1990’s
• Mission content and schedule unchanged
• Goal of achieving Node 2 launch schedule 
Return to Flight – Redesign 
• Redesign and recertification of SRM joint 
sealing systems
Return to Flight – Risk Management
• Selected redesigns, inspection and repair capabilities, 
and risk acceptance 
“NASA managers believed that the agency had a strong safety culture, but the Board found that 
the agency had the same conflicting goals that it did before Challenger, when schedule concerns, 
production pressure, cost-cutting and a drive for ever-greater efficiency – all the signs of an 
“operational” enterprise – had eroded NASA’s ability to assure mission safety. “  CAIB Report Page 35
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ET 129/127/130/131
TPS Producibility Enhancements
ET–121 RTF 
Modifications, Bipod 
Fitting, I/T Flange 
closeout, Feedline 
Bellows Heater, & 
Camera
ET– 124
Hail Damaged 
Tank
ET–125
ECO System 
Resolution
Processing Improvements
•Low Spray Guns
•Human Factors
•High Fidelity Mockups
•Video Review Of Sprays
•Improved Access
•Non Destructive Evaluation
•Producibility Enhancements
•GUCP Improvements
•Friction Stir Welding
Post Flight Assessment
•Imagery–Situational Awareness
•Failure Mode Assessment
•CAD Modeling
•Post Flight Assessment Process
•Historical Data Base
•Statistical Assessments
ET– 119
RTF II Modifications
PAL Ramp Removal
ET–120 
LH2 IFR Redesign 
Demonstration
ET– 128
First In-line Tank  LO2 
Feedline Brackets and 
LH2 IFR’s
Design Improvements
•Bipod Fitting
•Bellows Heater
•Feedline Camera
•PAL Removal
•LH2 Ice Frost Ramps
•LO2 Titanium Brackets
•ECO Feed Through
•Sixth Buy Tanks
Al 2219 Complex 
Curvature Panels, and 
Friction Stir Welding 
fully implemented on 
ET-134
Baseline 
SLWT Al-Li
SLWT Mass 
Unchanged
Katrina
Enabling 
ISS High 
Inclination 
Payload 
Mass
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Return to Flight Era
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RSRM-105 
Low Temp 
O-Ring
RSRM-107
Nozzle-to-Case 
Joint O-Ring
RSRM-94
TIGA 321 
RSRM-99 & 
ATK BSM Fwd.
RSRM-99 J-Leg 
Joint Insulation
RSRM-101
Carbon-Fiber 
Rope
RSRM-104
Fwd. Seg. Grain
IPT, Thrust 
Oscillation Data
RSRM-107
Inactive 
Stiffener Stub
Reliability via  
Process Control
Design Changes
•TIGA 321 Adhesive
•ATK Booster Separation Motor’s
•Carbon Fiber Rope
•Forward Grain Redesign
•Inactive Stiffener Stub Removal 
Processing and Capability Improvements
•Nozzle-To-Case J-Leg Joint Insulation
•Intelligent Pressure Transducer (IPT)
•Age Life Extensions
•Low Temp O-rings
RSRM -104
ATK BSM
Both Fwd. & Aft
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RSRM-103
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BI-125
Bolt Catcher
BI-125 & BI-126
SRB Cameras
BI-136 Frangible 
Nut Cross Over BI-135
HDP Retention Blocks
BI-127
4340 ETA Ring
BI-138 PBIS
BI-125
BSM Igniter
BI-130 CRD
EDAS Thrust 
Oscillation Data
BI-126, ET
Instrumentation
Design Improvements 
• Bolt Catcher
• Booster Separation Motor (BSM) Igniter
• 4340 External Tank Attach (ETA) Ring
• BSM Booster Trowelable Ablator (BTA)Closeout
• Command Receiver Decoder (CRD)
• Frangible Nut Cross Over
• Hold Down Post (HDP) Retention Blocks
• Power Bus Isolation System (PBIS)
• Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Pump
Improved Capabilities
• SRB Cameras
• Enhanced Data Acquisition System (EDAS) 
PAL Ramp removal dynamic data
• Environmentally Compliant Hypalon Paint
• Enhanced Data Acquisition System (EDAS) 
Thrust Oscillation Data
SR
B
ET
BI-144  APU Fuel 
Pump Upgrade
BI-125 NSI
Pressure  
Cartridge
BI-129
BSM BTA
Closeout
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Implemented Kevlar 
Insulation
Incorporated
Non-Integral Spark 
Ignition System
Implemented AHMS
23% Reliability 
Improvement
Redesigned Fuel 
Flowmeter
Redesigned HPOTP 
Knife Edge Seals
Improved 
LPOTP Joint 
O5 Durability
New Liquid Air
Insulators
Design Improvement Areas
• Advanced Health Management System (AHMS)
• Kevlar Insulation
• Non-Integral Spark Ignition System
• Fuel Flowmeter
• High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP ) Knife Edge Seals
• Software
• Rigid Fuel Bleed Duct
• Liquid Air Insulators
Processing & Operations Improvements
• Software Upgrades 
• Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(LPOTP) Joint O5 Enhancement
Reliability Improved By A 
Factor Of 3 During The Program
Incorporated 
Safety 
Enhancements 
into a New 
Version of 
Software
140% Nozzle Fabrication 
Performance 
Improvement
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Imagery Analysis
SRB Mounted 
Camera
ET Mounted 
Camera
Flame Trench
Window Mini-cam
SRB Forward &
ETA Ring Cameras
LOX Pre-valve 
Detent Roller Flow Control Valve
New Capabilities
•Imagery Analysis
•Risk Assessment Process
•Lift Off Debris Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
•Ground Lightning Monitoring System(GLMS)
•Day of Launch Wind Change Redline updates
Solving Problems
•LOX Pre-valve Detent Roller Solution
•Overboard Mixture Ratio (OBMR)
•Flow Control Valve (FCV) Evaluation And Flight Rationale
•Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP)
•Flowliner Placard
Commanded 
Mixture Ratio (CMR)
Ground Lightning 
Monitoring System (GLMS)Day of Launch Wind Change 
Redline Updates
Ground Umbilical 
Carrier Plate 
(GUCP)
Flowliner
Placard
Lift Off Debris CFD
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Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle 
Program
• Evidence of Cultural Change
• Level of Detail presented at Boards, Project and Program Reviews  is 
significantly increased:  Examples
 Removal of PAL Ramps prior to next flight after STS-114 loss
 Continued modifications to ET foam applications to reduce debris
 Robusted EPAT assessment and reporting process 
 On-Orbit repairs of OMS Blankets
 Bookkeeping time for Focused Inspection early in flight
 Content and format of On-Orbit MMT structured to highlight significant issues 
requiring MMT decisions
 Launch slips when decisions could not be supported by data
 Combined Safety Review with NASA Chief Engineering and Chief, Safety and 
Mission Assurance
 Level of detail required to disposition Launch constraint issues
 Respect and dignity extended to individuals with alternate or dissenting 
opinion throughout FRR and MMT processes
• Clear and Irrefutable evidence our Shuttle Culture has made a 
positive behavioral change
Conclusions
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